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ENDING THE DUAL SYSTEM OF AMERICAN
PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE URGENT NEED
FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Erwin Chemerinsky*
Almost three decades have passed since the Supreme Court proclaimed
in Brown v. Board of Education' that separate but equal has no place in
American public education. Unfortunately, despite thirty years of heated bat-
tles urban schools remain separate and unequal. In almost every major city
the pattern is the same: inner city school districts comprised predominantly,
or even exclusively, of racial minorities, surrounded by suburban schools
whose enrollments are nearly totally white. 2 In major metropolitan areas,
three out of four black children attend predominantly black schools.3 Forty
percent of black students attend schools that are ninety to one hundred per-
cent black.'
Perhaps this segregation would be tolerable if inner city and suburban
schools were otherwise equal.' By any measure, however, white schools are
far superior to those attended by racial minorities.' On the average, it is
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.S., Northwestern University; J.D.,
Harvard University. The author thanks Joseph Mikrut and Mari Beth Jelks for their excellent
research assistance and expresses his appreciation to Jeffrey Shaman and Marcy Strauss for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1). For an in depth description of the events and litigation
leading up to the decision in Brown, see R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
2. Justice Thurgood Marshall has observed that there is "an expanding core of virtually
all negro schools immediately surrounded by a receding band of all white schools." Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 785 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also UNITED STATES COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: DESEGREGATION OF
THE NATION'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 153-54 (1976) (Denver's public school student population has
a higher percentage of minorities than the general population); Note, Interdistrict Remedies
for Segregated Schools, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1173-74 (1979) (discussion of "white flight"
resulting in black inner city schools and white suburban schools in Wilmington, Chicago,
Louisville, Kansas City, and New York) (hereinafter cited as Interdistrict Remedies). See infra
notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
3. SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUC. OPPOITUNITY, TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPOR-
TUNITY, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 105, 116
(1972); UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON METROPOLITAN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION (1977) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENT].
4. STATEMENT, supra, at 3. According to the most recent statistics, in Illinois 68% of black
students attend schools that are 90-100% black. Illinois Schools Most Segregated, Chicago Sun
Times, Sept. 5, 1982, at 6, col. 1.
5. It should be noted that some prominent black educators favor abandoning efforts to
desegregate schools, preferring that all energies be devoted to improving the quality of black
schools. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 480-82, 488-93 (1976) (opposition to busing in-
creasing in black community because of its small effect on the quality of education) [hereinafter
cited as Serving Two Masters].
6. See Finger, Why Busing Plans Work, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE
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estimated that twenty percent more is spent on each white student's educa-
tion than on each black pupil's schooling.' White students have better
teachers, better facilities, and better curriculum.' This disparity in resources
is reflected in differences in achievement: whites continually outperform blacks
in every measure of educational attainment.9 It is beyond doubt that American
public schools are separate and unequal.
These inequities might be acceptable if education were of little importance.
However, few would disagree with Justice Warren's observation in Brown
that:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of educa-
tion in our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awaken-
ing the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity . . . is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms. 1
It is now almost thirty years since the Supreme Court ordered school
desegregation to occur with all deliberate speed.'' In light of the inequalities
58 (F. Levinsohn & B. Wright eds. 1976) (black children attending segregated schools receive
inferior educations) [hereinafter cited as Finger]. There are two ways of comparing the quality
of schools. One is to focus on the inputs, the resources invested in the educational systems.
See, e.g., Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977
DUKE L.J. 1099, 1107-09 (equal educational opportunity defined as the equalization of per
pupil expenditures); Note, School Finance Reform: Robinson v. Cahill, 13 URB. L. ANN. 139,
148 n.61 (1977) (must show correlation between money spent on education and the quality
of education to establish an equal protection claim). Alternatively, schools can be compared
on the basis of their outputs, the educational achievement of their students. See, e.g., Gordon,
Toward Defining Equality of Educational Opportunity, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 423 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972). By either measure, white schools
are far superior to those attended by racial minorities. See infra notes 5-7, 48-55 and accom-
panying text.
7. C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FORMAL SCHOOLING IN
AMERICA 28 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JENCKS].
8. J. COLEMEN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 1-6, 125-83 (1966) (comparing
predominantly white and predominantly black schools in terms of library and textbook availability,
facilities, curriculum offered, and the quality of teachers) [hereinafter cited as COLEMAN]; F.
HARRIS & J. LINDSAY, COMMISSION ON THE CITIES IN THE 70's: THE STATE OF THE CITIES 47-63
(1972) (the Kerner Commission found that ghetto schools have less qualified teachers, less
equipped buildings and less money per pupil than white suburban schools) [hereinafter cited
as HARRIS & LINDSAY].
9. COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 20-23 (disparity in achievement between whites and blacks
increases at higher grade levels); JENCKS, supra note 7, at 106 (documenting a difference in
test scores between white and black students of 10 to 20%).
10. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (Brown 1).
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown 11).
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in urban public education, it is imperative that action be taken to make
Brown's dream a reality.
Since beginning the battle to end the dual system of education, efforts
generally have focused on obtaining judicial orders to desegregate schools
and equalize resources." Unfortunately, restrictive Supreme Court decisions
limiting the availability of judicial relief have made it impossible for the
federal courts to remedy the inequities in American public education.' 3 Yet,
despite the inherent futility of litigation, efforts remain almost exclusively
centered on securing judicial remedies for segregated, unequal schools." Little
attention has been paid to the possibility of legislative action to insure equal
educational opportunity.' 5
Only legislation creating metropolitan school districts can succeed in
eliminating the dual system of education that has existed throughout American
history. Such legislation, at either the federal or state level, is politically
feasible and would guarantee equal educational opportunity for rich and poor,
whites and minorities. Section one of this article discusses the urgent need
for action to change the current educational system. Section two argues that
only metropolitan school districts can achieve equal educational opportunity
12. UNTED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REVIEWING THE DECADE OF SCHOOL DESEGREGA-
TION, 1966-1975 1-1 (1977) (tables demonstrating that courts were the major intervening source
of school desegregation). For a discussion of the judiciary's efforts to desegregate schools,
see L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER By DECREE (1976) [hereinafter cited as GRAGLIA]; J. WILKINSON,
FROM BROWN TO BAKKE (1979) [hereinafter cited as WILKINSON].
13. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Supreme Court held that federal courts
may not issue a multidistrict, area-wide remedy for a school segregation violation by a single
district. The Court's rationale for this restrictive decision was that there was no proof that
one district had caused segregation in another district, there was no proof that district bound-
ary lines were formed to foster segregation, and there was no proof that the included districts
were not given the opportunity to be heard. Further, in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court limited strict judicial scrutiny to school financing
cases involving laws operating to the disadvantage of suspect classes or which interfere with
fundamental rights. See.also Wright, Are the Courts Abandoning the Cities?, 4 J.L. & EDUC.
218, 220-22 (1975) (arguing that the combined effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in Milliken
and Rodriquez is to prevent effective judicial action to create equal educational opportunity)
[hereinafter cited as Wright]. For further discussion of restrictive Supreme Court decisions,
see infra notes 141-69 and accompanying text.
14. This Article does not suggest that it is not the proper role of the courts to act to
desegregate schools and equalize educational opportunity. Rather, the point is that recent deci-
sions by the Supreme Court indicate that effective judicial actions will not be forthcoming.
Hence, attention must turn to the legislature and the possibility for statutory action to solve
the problem. See infra notes 141-89 and accompanying text.
15. G. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 454-55 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MUST WE Bus?].
Professor Orfield has recognized that:
[tlhere has been little serious discussion of the many ways Congress could exercise
its power to address public concern about the desegregation process, to set national
minimum standards that would produce some desegregation even without court
orders, and, on the most ambitious level, to replace the judicial process by enact-
ing legislation that would remedy all constitutional violations.
Id. at 442.
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and considers the possible arguments against metropolitan districts. Finally,
section three outlines the need for legislative action, examining the impossi-
bility of effective judicial relief and the desirability of legislation to create
metropolitan school districts.
THE IMPERATIVE FOR ACTION: URBAN EDUCATION IN THE 1980's
The Current Realities
In most major cities school district lines parallel political boundaries. 6
That is, there is a separate school district for each political subdivision; each
city and suburb has its own school system." Although, in itself, such
fragmentation of authority over schooling among many different districts
in a single metropolitan area is not objectionable,' 8 the effect is to separate
whites from blacks, and rich from poor. In virtually every urban area, the
inner city is predominantly, and increasingly, comprised of racial minorities.' 9
By contrast, the surrounding suburbs are almost exclusively white."0 What
little minority population does reside in the suburbs is concentrated in isolated
towns that are almost entirely black."
16. Comment, Milliken v. Bradley in Historical Perspective: The Supreme Court Comes
Full Circle, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 799, 806 (1975) (school district boundary lines commonly based
on political subdivisions) [hereinafter cited as Historical Perspective].
17. Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles
and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely From Within, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535, 538
[hereinafter cited as Sedler].
18. In fact, some might praise the existence of separate school districts on the ground that
they help provide for local control over education. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 741-44 (1974) (local autonomy over schools believed to be necessary to the quality of
the educational process); C. BENSON, ECONOMICS OF Puauac EDUCATION 226-29, 241 (1961) (discus-
sion of the economic benefits of local control of school funding); M. COHEN, B. LEVIN, &
R. BEAVER, THE POLITICAL LIMITS TO SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 21-23 (1973) (proponents of
local control contend local control depoliticizes education and preserves financial and educa-
tional resources) [hereinafter cited as POLITICAL LIMITS]. Such praise of localism, however, may
be no more than a rhetorical cover to permit white suburbs to devote all of their educational
resources to their residents' advantage in segregated schools. See Taylor, Avoiding the "Thicket,"
2 J.L. & EDUC. 482, 483 (1973). See generally W. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION,
SIGNIFICANCE 146-47 (1964) (claims of localism permit local majorities to suppress local minorities).
Moreover, it is quite possible to preserve local control while still eliminating separate, unequal
schools. See infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
19. It is predicted that by the year 2000, central cities' populations nationally will be 75%
racial minorities and only 25% white. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPOR-
TUNITY IN SUBURBIA 4 (1974). For a detailed discussion of the racial composition of cities and
suburbs, see NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUI.DING Tim AMERICAN CrrY 42-44 (1968);
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF METROPOLITAN
AND NON-METROPOLITAN POPULATIONS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, SPECIAL STUDIES, #75
at 20-28 (1978).
20. See supra note 17.
21. Pettigrew, A Sociological View of the Post-Milliken Era, in MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY: THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION, CONFERENCE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES COM-
MISSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS 69-70 (1974) (report prepared by F. Routh, E. Waldo, & C. Hurley)
[hereinafter cited as Pettigrew].
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It is impossible to identify any single cause for the separation of whites
and blacks into segregated cities and suburbs. A complex set of factors have
combined to create this racial isolation including exclusionary zoning, restric-
tive covenants, discriminatory insurance and loan policies, location of public
housing, and individual discriminatory practices of real estate brokers and
property owners.22 It must be emphasized that the segregation of cities and
suburbs is not a matter of each race simply choosing to live by itself or
economics precluding the races frombeing able to live together.3 Segrega-
tion is largely a product of governmental policies and practices throughout
the course of American history." For example, until relatively recently, the
Federal Housing Authority officially encouraged separation of the races in
issuing mortgages and loan guarantees." The FHA Official Manual prohibited
issuance of loans which would cause "[i]nfiltration of unharmonious racial
or nationality groups." '2 6 This translated into whites receiving federal
assistance to buy homes in the suburbs, while blacks only could obtain aid
for central city dwellings.
Similarly, during the 1950's and 1960's, urban renewal caused the destruc-
22. As one commentator noted:
[m]ost residential segregation observable throughout the United States is probably
due to a combination of institutional and individual discrimination having little
to do with school authorities: exclusionary zoning, restrictive covenants, discriminatory
Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration insurance and loan
policies, siting of public housing, and the practices of mortgage lenders, real estate
brokers, and individual property owners.
Note, Interdistrict Desegregation: The Remaining Options, 28 STAN. L. REV. 521, 529 (1976).
See J. DENTON, APARTHEID AMERICAN STYLE 37-75 (1967); R. FORMAN, BLACK GHETTOS, WHITE
GHETTOS, AND SLUMS 33, 69-79 (1971).
23. STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 14-15 (segregation today still largely due to state action
rather than income differences or individual choice). See Farley, Residential Segregation and
Its Implications for School Integration, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 164, 168-69 (1975).
24. Cf. Taylor, The Supreme Court and Urban Reality: A Tactical Analysis of Milliken
v. Bradley, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 751, 765-68 (1975). The practices discussed in this article in-
clude discrimination in the issuance of federal mortgage insurance during the 1930-40's, state
court enforcement of private restrictive covenants, and the ineffectiveness of recent governmen-
tal attempts to provide fair housing. The article also notes that segregation in cities and suburbs
cannot have been caused by economic factors because blacks often pay higher rents than whites,
blacks often do not live close to their job location, and few blacks hold jobs in suburbs.
25. C. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 229-43 (1971). The Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) adopted a segregation of races policy that existed until 1950. Id. at 234. The FHA's
official manual stated that properties within a neighborhood must be occupied by "the same
social and racial classes" if stability was to be maintained. Id. at 234. Pursuant to this policy,
FHA agents prevented minorities from buying homes in white neighborhoods and pressured
builders and lenders not to deal with minorities. Id. at 229-30. See also Comment, The Public
Housing Administration and Discrimination in Federally Assisted Low Rent Housing, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 751, 762-63 (1966) (discussion of intentional segregation on the part of the Public
Housing Administration).
26. The Federal Housing Authority Official Manual (FHA Official Manual) is quoted in
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67, 215 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058
(4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by evenly divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). See also STATEMENT, supra
note 3, at 23 (quoting FHA Underwriter's Manual).
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tion of 400,000 housing units, but only three percent of the residences ever
were rebuilt.27 The result was to force many black families to relocate to
the poor, more blighted areas, because they could not obtain homes outside
the central cities. 8 Furthermore, low-income public housing was constructed
almost exclusively in inner cities because the FHA permitted suburbs to veto
construction of such housing.29 The net effect of these and similar govern-
mental practices30 was to separate the races along the political boundary lines
of cities and suburbs.
Because school district lines are drawn to match political boundary lines
which separate whites from blacks, inevitably schools are racially segregated.'
In 1980, "63 percent of black students and 66 percent of hispanics were
in segregated schools, that is, schools with more than half minority
enrollment."' 2 The statistics for specific cities are even more startling. In
Chicago, in 1981, whites comprised only 17 percent of students in the public
school system. 3 3 In Washington, D.C., the public schools are over 96 per-
cent black.' In Baltimore, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami,
Memphis, New York, and Philadelphia whites constitute less than one-third
of the students enrolled in public schools."
Moreover, political boundary lines do not just divide on the basis of race,
they also separate on the basis of income. The surburban school systems
are much wealthier than central city school districts. 6 This difference in
wealth translates into great disparity in the ability to provide revenues for
education.
Local governments provide the majority of funding for schools." Ninety-
eight percent of local governmental revenues are derived from property
taxes.'" Altogether, local property taxes provide about sixty-two percent of
27. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 163 (1968).
28. STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 25.
29. Id. See generally Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (HUD found in violation
of fifth amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1964 by selecting city rather than suburban sites
for public housing).
30. See supra note 24.
31. Smedley, Developments in the Law of School Desegregation, 26 VAND. L. REV. 405,
412 (1973).
32. Illinois Schools Most Segregated, Chicago Sun Times, Sept. 5, 1982, at 6, col. 1.
33. CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, RACIAL/ETHNIC SURVEY-STUDENTS AS OF OCTOBER 30, 1981
2 (1981).
34. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., The President's National Urban
Policy Report, 1980 at 10-12.
35. Ziemba, School Desegregation Called Key to City, Chi. Tribune, Feb. 8, 1983, § 2,
at 3, col. 1.
36. See Michelson, The Political Economy of Public School Finance, in SCHOOLING IN A
CORPORATE SOCIETY (M. Carnoy ed. 1972); Michelson, Reform Through State Legislatures:
What is a Just System for Financing Schools? 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 436 (1974).
37. Thomas, Equalizing Educational Opportunity Through School Financing Reform: A
Review Assessment, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 255, 255-56 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Thomas].
38. NATIONAL EDUC. FINANCING PROJECT, ALTERNATE PROGRAMS FOR FINANCING EDUCA-
TION 61 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL EDUC. FINANCING PROJECT]; Thomas, supra note
37, at 261.
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educational expenditures. 9 Property taxes raise money relative to the value
of the property. The greater the assessed -,aluation of the property, the larger
the amount of tax money available."0 Thus, political boundary lines create
cities and suburbs with markedly different resource bases. As the National
Educational Financing Project noted: "Variations in assessed valuation of
property exists in some states exceeding 10,000 to 1. . . .Other states have
variations on the order of 500 to 1.'"" For example, in Cook County, Illinois,
the wealth of the richest elementary school district was thirty-five times that
of the poorest. 2 In California, "the assessed valuation per unit of average
daily attendence of elementary school children ranged from a low of $103
to a peak of $952,156-a ratio of nearly 10,000 to 1.""
These variations in wealth mean that poor school districts must tax their
property at exorbitant rates to get the same amount of revenue that richer
school districts can obtain with much lower assessments."' In other words,
districts with low tax bases must often tax themselves at rates much higher
than wealthier districts. 5 The facts in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez16 illustrate this disparity. The town of Edgewood, Texas,
with an assessed property value per pupil of $5,960, taxed property owners
at a rate of 1.00 percent of assessed valuation, and raised $26 for the educa-
tion of each child. State and federal support increased Edgewood per pupil
expenditures to $356. By contrast, the Alamo Heights, Texas school district
had a property tax base of more than $49,000 per pupil. Implementing a
tax rate of only .85 percent, the town of Alamo Heights raised $333 per
student, which together with federal and state grants yielded a total expen-
diture of $594 per pupil.47
Unfortunately, even imposing extraordinarily high tax rates, the poor school
districts cannot match the expenditures of the wealthier school systems."
39. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON SCHOOL FINANCE, BIG CITY SCHOOLS IN AMERICA 4 (1971).
40. Thomas, supra note 37, at 261 (property taxes vary according to community's wealth
and willingness to tax).
41. NATIONAL EDUC. FINANCING PROJECT, supra note 38, at 176.
42. J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 45
n.8 (1970) [hereinafter cited as COONS].
43. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 592, 487 P.2d 1241, 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606 (1971).
44. Stern, Some Speculation on School Finance and a More Egalitarian Society, 5 EDUC.
& URB. Soc. 223, 226 (1976); Shalala & Williams, Political Perspectives on Efforts to Reform
School Finance, 4 POL'Y STUD. J. 367, 368 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Shalala & Williams].
45. See J. BERKE, ANSWERS TO INEQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF NEW SCHOOL FINANCE (1974)
[hereinafter cited as BERKE]; R. HARRISON, EQUALITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE (1976)
[hereinafter cited as HARRISON]; Silard & Goldstein, Toward Abolition of Local Funding in
Public Education, 3 J. L. & EDuc. 307, 311-12 (1974).
46. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
47. Id. at 12-13.
48. Thomas, supra note 37, at 261; Shalala & Williams, supra note 44, at 368. Moreover,
there is an inequity in forcing poor districts, with little resources, to tax themselves at exorbi-
tant rates. Specifically, there is a decreasing marginal utility of money. To illustrate, if one
individual has $100,000 and another individual has $1000, and both individuals lose 5% to
tax, the impact on the wealthier individual is much less than that of the poorer individual.
As such, rich districts could more easily tolerate a higher rate of taxes than poor districts.
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As a result, far more money is spent for the education of suburban students
than for inner city pupils. For example, the Clayton School District, a
predominately white suburb of St. Louis, spends $3,441 per student on educa-
tion, while St. Louis, a school system that is over 70% black, spends $1,863
per student."9 Overall, on the average, 15% to 20% more is spent on each
white student's education than on each black student's. 50
The difference in expenditures translates into vast disparities in the quality
of educational programs. Charles Benson, Professor of Educational Ad-
ministration at Berkeley, observed:
In general, low quality of programs and high tax load were positively cor-
related. Even by taxing themselves far above the average, poor districts
still were able to finance only a meager set of educational offerings. In-
deed, the poor places could not, under any reasonable interpretation of
public duty, fulfill the minimum state mandated requirements for schools. ' ,
Inadequate resources mean that poorer, predominantly black, inner city
districts hire less qualified teachers and have significantly higher teacher-pupil
ratios.52 Similarly, inner city students attend the shabbiest, most outmoded
schools, with the fewest materials for learning. 3 The separation of school
districts along political boundary lines has created wealthy schools for whites
and comparatively inadequate schools for blacks. State aid intended to
equalize expenditures for education "is insufficient to overcome variations
in local revenues based on the property tax."" The politically powerful subur-
ban areas have acted to create "floors" and "ceilings" on aid which make
it impossible for even state grants to eliminate the disparities in expenditures.
States provide a minimum amount of aid for all districts regardless of their
wealth and set a maximum amount of state aid, limiting what even the poorest
districts can receive from the state.5"
The total picture emerging from this description is one that cannot be
ignored. America has a dual system of education: separate and unequal.
The Necessity for Action
Some might look at this analysis and argue that change is unnecessary
because there is no significant harm from the inequities described above.
They would point to studies which ostensibly demonstrate that segregation
49. Note, Equality in Public School Financing: Missouri's Need for Reform, 19 URB. L.
ANN. 133, 134 n.6 (1980).
50. JENCKS, supra note 7, at 28.
51. C. BENSON, Ti- ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 156-57 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as BENSON].
52. See COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 1-6, 125-83; HARRIS & LINDSAY, supra note 8.
53. Thomas, supra note 37, at 261.
54. Id. at 260-61. The evidence is overwhelming that nothing has been done to eliminate
or even reduce the inequities that studies in the late 1960's and early 1970's documented. See,
e.g., Brown, Ginsburg, Killahela, Rosthal, & Tron, School Finance Reform in the Seventies:
Achievements and Failures, in SELECTED PAPERS ON SCHOOL FINANCE 57, 99-100 (1978).
55. BERKE, supra note 45, at 14; Thomas, supra note 37, at 261-62.
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has no ill effects on educational achievement.56 In fact, there is research
that purports to prove that expenditures for schools have no relationship
to educational quality or scholastic achievement. 7 Furthermore, there are
assertions that education itself does not matter because it has little effect
on social advancement.5 " Thus, some could argue that separate, unequal
schools are tolerable because no concrete harms have been demonstrated.
However, for three reasons, the arguments against school integration are
without merit. First, the denial of equal opportunity for racial minorities
is, in itself, a mandate for action even if desegregation and increased expen-
ditures would not improve learning or social status. The guarantee of equality
is of central importance in American society; 9 the assurance of equality is
morally, analytically, and rhetorically necessary. 60
Equality is morally essential because it compels us to care about how peo-
ple are treated in relation to one another. It is morally wrong for a majority
to treat a minority differently than it treats itself.6 ' As Justice Jackson stated
over a quarter of a century ago:
There is no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which
56. See, e.g., Goodman, DeFacto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 426-27 (1972) (impact of integrated education on students
is uncertain and variable) [hereinafter cited as Goodman]; van der Haag, Social Science Testimony
in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REv. 69, 75-77
(1955) (no proof exists that segregation is more humiliating to black children than integration).
But see Hawley, The New Mythology of School Desegregation, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
214, 218 (1978) (of 73 studies surveying the effects of desegregation on education a positive
effect was found in 40; no effect was measured in 21; and a negative effect was discovered
in only 12) [hereinafter cited as Hawley]. See generally St. John, Desegregation and Minority
Group Performance, 40 REV. EDUC. RESEARCH 111 (1972) (judicially mandated desegregation
imposed before empirical research on effect of segregation on educational achievement existed).
57. See JENCKS, supra note 7, at 94-95. But see McDermott & Klein, The Cost-Quality
Debate in School Finance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference?, 38 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 415 (1974) (discussion of social scientific research supporting the notion of a relation-
ship between amounts spent and quality of education) [hereinafter cited as McDermott & Klein];
Walberg & Rasher, Public School Effectiveness and Equality: New Evidence and Its Implica-
tions, 56 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 3, 3-9 (1974) (analysis of research showing a relationship between
amounts spent and quality of education) [hereinafter cited as Walberg & Rasher].
58. See COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 325. But see HARRISON, supra note 45, at 186-92 (discus-
sion of the available research on the effects of schooling concluding that education has a
disproportionate positive effect on students with fewer social and economic resources).
59. But see Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. :537 (1982) (the princi-
ple of equality is confusing, logically erroneous and "empty of content").
60. The argument that the concept of equality is essential morally, analytically, and rhetorically
is developed in Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 201 (1983).
61. There is a rich volume of literature defending equality as a moral imperative. See, e.g.,
J. Rousseau, The Social Contract Book I1, Ch. IV, in F. COICER, READINGS IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 646-47 (rev. ed. 1938) (under the social compact theory, all citizens are equal
and the government cannot burden one citizen over another). For additional discussion of the
concept of equality, see NoMos IX: EQUALITY (R. Pennock, ed. 1967); J. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1971); R. TAWNEY, EQUALITY (1931).
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officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Con-
versely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will
apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might
be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take
no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that
the laws be equal in operation.62
Yet, the white majority treats racial minorities far differently than it treats
itself. Whites have created a system whereby much more is spent on their
education than is spent on education for blacks or hispanics.63 Whites,
through state governments which they historically have controlled, have
designed school districts which parallel political boundary lines and have
systematically excluded minorities from suburban schools.64 Because the
majority provides for minorities differently than it provides for itself, separate
and unequal education is morally objectionable.
Additionally, the notion of equality is analytically necessary because it
creates a presumption that people should be treated alike, and places the
burden of proof on those who wish to discriminate. A presumption in favor
of treating people alike requires that there be a compelling reason for treating
people differently. 5 In other words, those who advocate equal educational
opportunity do not have the burden to prove that it will make a difference.
Rather, those who oppose it should be required to offer a strong justifica-
tion against equality of education.6 Few today, however, would argue that
racial minorities deserve to be treated in a manner inferior to whites.
Furthermore, the principle of equality is rhetorically important because
it is a powerful symbol that helps to safeguard rights that would be other-
wise unprotected. The inequalities in educational resources and the segrega-
tion of minorities transmit a message that stigmatizes black schools as being
inadequate. Even if expenditures on education do not have much effect, the
fact that white suburbs spend so much on education is an indication, at
least rhetorically, that expenditures on education are important.67 Thus, inner
62. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
63. See supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
65. One commentator recognized that:
[tihere is that enduring something which causes us to ask the state to make its
case for distinguishing two humans, if it is to treat them differently; the state may
make its case in a thousand ways and it may be assisted in this by presumptions
galore, but make it it must.
CooNs, supra note 42, at 302.
66. Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There Is But One Constitution, 7 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 32 (1972) (there should be a presumption against segregated schools and
they should be permitted to exist only if they serve a compelling interest that cannot be attain-
ed in other ways).
67. One commentator noted that "[wihatever it is that money may be thought to contribute
to the education of children, that commodity is something highly prized by those who enjoy
the greatest measure of it." CooNs, supra note 42, at 30.
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city schools that possess far fewer educational resources will be perceived
by whites and blacks as being inferior. Similarly, the strong opposition of
whites to being bused into black schools6" conveys a message that these
schools are not equal to those in the suburbs. The result is that notwith-
standing reality, whites are perceived as having something that blacks and
hispanics do not. Inevitably, this message imposes a stigma on minority
members; they are confined to inferior schools. Even if desegregation and
greater expenditures will not improve learning, minorities have the right to
equal educational opportunities to assure this stigma is eliminated. 6 1
In sum, the denial of equal education is a reason why change is imperative,
regardless of whether reforms will improve schooling or society. Even if more
money does not ensure a better education, blacks and hispanics should have
an equal opportunity to be disappointed by its failure.7"
Second, inequality in schooling might be tolerable if all schools were
minimally adequate. No one denies that there is value to some formal school-
ing or that some expenditures are a prerequisite to providing a basic
education.7' The studies purporting to question the value of increased
expenditures for education merely demonstrate that beyond a certain point
the benefits of additional funds for education diminish. 2 The assumption
is that American society has reached this threshold and provides a minimal-
ly sufficient education to all its citizens. Yet, by any measure, inner city
schools are simply inadequate. 3 They do not have the resources necessary
to provide even a minimally sufficient education to all students. As such,
68. There have been repeated attempts by the federal government to limit court ordered
busing. See, e.g., Neighborhood School Act of 1981, S. 528, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
Rac. S1481-84 (1981); The Education Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 484 (codified as amended
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1974)).
69. The importance of avoiding the stigma of separate, unequal schools was integral to
the Court's decision in Brown: "To separate them from others of similar age and qualifica-
tions solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown
1, 347 U.S. at 494. For development of the argument that segregated schools stigmatize minori-
ty students, see Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426-27
(1960) (effect of segregation is to place blacks in a position of "walled-off inferiority"); Brest,
Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1976)
(in Brown the Supreme Court gave recognition that segregated schools stigmatize minority
students); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 MARV.
L. REV. 564, 568-69 (1965) (given the importance of public education in our society the racial
stigma imposed by segregation must be deemed significant); Goodman, supra note 56, at 295
(stigma placed on black schools will not dissipate until those schools lose their racial identity).
70. CooNs, supra note 42, at 30.
71. Inequality in School Finance, 1971: Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on
Equal Educational Opportunity, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6727 (1971) (statement of David Selden,
President, American Federation of Teachers).
72. None of the studies purport to conclude that education or expenditures are irrelevant.
Rather, they simply question the strength of the correlations between education and achieve-
ment and expenditures and learning. See supra note 57.
73. Benson, supra note 51, at 156-57.
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it is meaningless to argue over what is the point of diminishing returns for
additional expenditures; inner city schools clearly are nowhere close.
74
Finally, at best, studies attacking the value of desegregation, of greater
educational expenditures, or of the importance of education simply create
uncertainty. On balance, research literature demonstrates a strong correla-
tion between desegregation and educational achievement and improved in-
terracial attitudes.75 Likewise, most studies show a positive relationship be-
tween expenditures and educational attainment.7 6 If these studies are called
into question, the issue becomes, how should the conflicting evidence be
construed? That is, if society is unsure of the value of desegregation or greater
expenditures, how should it act until research is more certain? Should nothing
be done until there is a definitive resolution of the unanswered empirical
questions?
Even if there is uncertainty, action to create equal educational opportunities
is essential.7 If society provides desegregated, equal education, and the results
of these efforts prove insignificant, at most society misspent some money
in pursuit of equality. On the other hand, if society does not eliminate its
dual school system, and segregated, poorly funded schools are harmful, then
generations of minority children will be irreparably injured. Minority children
will have been robbed of their right to fully participate in society; they will
have been denied their chance to realize their full potential as human beings.
This is a risk society cannot afford to take. Until it is conclusively proven
otherwise, unequal schools must be presumed harmful and must be
eliminated.
THE NEED FOR METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS: TOWARDS
A UNITARY SYSTEM OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION
The Futility of Intradistrict Remedies
Attempts to eliminate the dual system of education have focused almost
74. Finger, supra note 6, at 58.
75. See, e.g., Amir, The Role of Intergroup Contact in Change of Prejudice and Ethnic
Relations, in TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM 288 (P. Katz ed. 1976) (research shows
positive relation when contact is with persons of equal or higher status in a non-competitive
environment); Hawley, supra note 53, at 218 (use of input-output statistical studies reveal a
positive effect on black achievement if desegregation is accomplished in the primary grades);
McConahay, The Effects of School Desegregation Upon Students Racial Attitudes and Behavior:
A Critical Review of the Literature and a Protegomenon to Future Research, 42 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 73, 101 (Summer, 1978) (literature shows improved interracial interaction and
friendship patterns in desegregated schools); Rossell, School Desegregation and Community Social
Change, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 147, 177 (Summer, 1978) (research on community
attitudes shows that desegregation of schools results in a decrease in racial intolerance in both
the North and the South).
76. See, e.g., C. BENSON, THE CHEERULtn PROSPECT: A STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION 22-26 (1965) (comparison of high-expenditure versus low-expenditure districts and
the resulting effect on educational quality); McDermott & Klein, supra note 57 (discussion of
statistical analysis used to show correlation between expenditures and educational attainment).
77. See Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of Uncer-
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exclusively on intradistrict remedies. Courts have concentrated on ordering
school districts to develop plans to eliminate all vestiges of segregation
resulting from district policies.78 For example, courts frequently have ordered
busing of pupils within districts to achieve desegregation.79 The Supreme
Court, however, has strongly resisted attempts to develop judicially imposed
interdistrict remedies to equalize expenditures or achieve integration.80
Unfortunately, the focus on intradistrict solutions is misplaced; intra-
district remedies can never achieve desegregation or equalize educational
resources. The existence of separate school districts, paralleling political boun-
dary lines, creates the dual system of education. Equal educational oppor-
tunity only can be achieved by breaking down the barriers between city and
suburban school districts.' Simple demographics insure the failure of remedies
limited to central city areas; specifically, if reforms only include inner cities,
over seventy percent of whites earning more than $10,000 a year would not
be included in the program.2
Effective desegregation cannot occur if the remedy is confined to the inner
cities. There are not enough white students in most major cities to achieve
desegregation. 3 In most large urban areas, central cities' public schools are
over two-thirds black.8 4 As such, there are not enough white students to
permit integration of inner city schools.85 For example, in Atlanta, Georgia,
tainty, 6 J. L. & EDUC. 3 (1977) (arguing that uncertainty is insufficient to justify denying
a constitutional remedy for segregated schools).
78. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (school board ordered
to eliminate dual school system resulting from recent intentionally segregative actions); Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (duty imposed on school boards is not to
merely abandon discriminatory practices, but to undertake affirmative action to eradicate ill
effects of segregation); Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (dual school district is in-
ferred when board carries out program of segregation).
79. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (discussion
of four problem areas confronting court ordered busing within the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school
district: racial quotas, single race schools, attendance zones, and transportation); Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass.) (in developing an intradistrict desegregation plan, a volun-
tary desegregation plan was held to be inappropriate where more effective methods were
reasonably available), stay of implementation denied, 523 F.2d 917 (1st Cir. 1975), aff'd, 530
F.2d 401 (lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
80. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
81. Interdistrict Remedies, supra note 2, at 1168 (the inner city schools are predominantly
black and the suburban school districts are predominantly white, therefore, the only way to
remedy segregation is to remove the barriers between city and suburban school districts). See
also Sedler, supra note 17, at 539 (effective desegregation and the prevention of resegregation
can be achieved only by imposing a metropolitan school district across the existing urban-
surburban district lines).
82. MUST WE Bus?, supra note 15, at 407.
83. Historical Perspective, supra note 16, at 805-06 (exodus of white families from inner cities
has resulted in predominantly black inner city school populations); Sedler, supra note 17, at 538
(increasing white-flight renders intradistrict desegregation remedies ineffective).
84. Ziemba, School Desegregation Called Key to City,. Chi. Tribune, Feb. 8, 1983, § 2,
at 3, col. 1.
85. Smedley, Developments in the Law of School Desegregation, 26 VAND. L. REV. 405,
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over eighty-five percent of the students in the public school system are black."
Thus, the Fifth Circuit was compelled to conclude that the Atlanta school
system was desegregated, even though 92 out of 148 schools had more than
ninety percent black enrollment, because it was impossible to achieve a greater
degree of integration in light of the relative absence of white students. 7 Unless
interdistrict remedies are employed, there is no way to effectively desegregate
cities such as Atlanta. As Professor Smedley explains:
Regardless of the cause, the result of this movement [of whites to subur-
ban areas] is that the remaining city public school population becomes
predominately black. When this process has occurred, no amount of at-
tendance zone revision, pairing and clustering of schools, and busing of
students within the city school district could achieve substantially integrated
student bodies in the school, because there simply are not enough white
students left in the city system."
Likewise, suburban school districts cannot be desegregated via intradistrict
remedies because there are few, if any, minority students in the suburbs.
Furthermore, efforts to desegregate inner cities are often counter-
productive. Desegregation of central city schools frequently causes massive
"white-flight" to suburban areas, making desegregation efforts even more
difficult.89 It is simply impossible to desegregate urban schools by relying
solely on intradistrict remedies.
Similarly, expenditures for education never can be equalized so long as
cities and suburbs maintain separate school systems. The disparity in the
resource bases of cities and suburbs is such that inner cities cannot possibly
match suburban expenditures for education. 0 Nor will suburban areas per-
mit adequate state aid to alleviate the revenue disparities. Under the cur-
rent system, the suburbs are unwilling to allow their tax dollars to be used
to provide adeqauate grants for inner city areas.'
412 (1973) (Richmond, Virginia and Detroit, Michigan are cited as examples) [hereinafter cited
as Smedley].
86. Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804, 805-08 (N.D. Ga.), modified, 451 F.2d 583 (5th
Cir. 1971), vacated in part and remanded, 469 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1972), 362 F. Supp. 1249
(N.D. Ga. 1973) (opinion on remand).
87. Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975).
88. Smedley, supra note 85, at 412.
89. Armor, White Flight and the Future of School Desegregation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGA-
TION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 208 (W. Stephan & J. Feagan eds. 1980). See also Cole-
man, School Desegregation and Loss of Whites from Large Central-City School Districts, in
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: THE COURTS AND SUBURBAN MIGRATION 96, 117-18 (United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights (1975)) (statistical results of desegregation on inner city population of
blacks and whites); Orfield, Research, Politics, and the Antibusing Debate, 42 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 141, 170 (1978) (manipulation of "white-flight" research to approve court ordered
busing) [hereinafter cited as Antibusing Debate].
90. BENSON, supra note 51, at 156-57.
91. BERKE, supra note 45 at 14; J. PINCUS, SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION 1-2 (1974);
Thomas, supra note 37, at 261. In general, it is unlikely that the rich will ever provide ade-
quate support for social programs for the poor unless they also will somehow benefit. See
generally Zarefsky, Book Review, 53 TEX. L. REv. 636, 637-39, 651-52 (1975) (discussing the
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Some might contend that the above analysis is not an objection to intra-
district remedies; rather, it is an argument for integrating cities and suburbs.
If housing patterns were desegregated so that rich and poor, whites and
minorities, lived in the same places, the entire problem would be solved.
While this is certainly true, society cannot wait for housing desegregation
to occur before solving the crisis in education.92 The degree of residential
separation is decreasing so slowly that, absent a sudden change in the rate,
it will be four to five centuries before cities and suburbs are integrated.93
Ending the dual system of education clearly requires an abandonment of
intradistrict strategies.
Ending the Dual System of Education: Metropolitan School Districts
The above analysis demonstrates that separation of school districts along
political boundary lines divides rich from poor, whites from minorities, and
insures the existence of a dual system of education. Therefore, the solution
to these problems must involve the elimination of the numerous separate
school districts within each metropolitan area.9 The remedy must be to create
one public school system for all residents-city and suburban dwellers alike-
of an urban area.9" Such metropolitan school districts would create a unitary
system of education: the school district would include whites and blacks,
the wealthy, and the impoverished.
Specifically, such metropolitan districts would permit effective desegrega-
tion of the public school system.96 As Professor Sedler noted, "desegrega-
tion on a metropolitan basis can often eliminate most, if not all, predominant-
ly black schools. . . . [I]f metropolitan desegregation were required many
of the country's metropolitan areas could be desegregated effectively." 97
Whites and minorities would be part of the same district and could be
assigned to schools so as to insure a racial balance. Administration of separate
city and suburban school systems often precludes integration of neighboring
districts that have different racial compositions and could be easily
desegregated."
Further, metropolitan school districts are the best way to desegregate urban
concept of a "unitary" system for providing services to the poor) [hereinafter cited as Book
Review).
92. STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 65; G. ORFIELD, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND URBAN SOCIETY
7 (1976).
93. Pettigrew, supra note 21, at 70.
94. See Sedler, supra note 17, at 543 (educational apartheid along central city and subur-
ban lines will exist until and unless metropolitan desegregation occurs).
95. Metropolitan areas are defined by the Census Bureau as Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas which are basically urban areas including both cities and suburbs. Id. at 539.
96. Note, Interdistrict Desegregation: The Remaining Options, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 521, 536
(1976) (once deemed legally appropriate, interdistrict metropolitan desegregation across existing
district lines will probably be effective due to overwhelmingly white suburban populations).
97. Sedler, supra note 17, at 539, 542-43.
98. Must We Bus?, supra note 15, at 148-49.
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schools99 because they provide the only solution to the problem of "white
flight." '  Programs to desegregate inner cities permit whites to flee to the
suburbs and escape inclusion. If the suburbs were included in the desegrega-
tion program, however, whites would have no incentive to leave the central
cities. As Judge J. Skelly Wright explains:
[w]hite flight can be slowed, and eventually reversed, only by incorporating
the suburbs and the central city into a single political community, capable
of removing the incentives to mass segregation .... Only with metropolitan
government can we begin to replace fear and hate with the development
of a sense that each citizen's fate is necessarily linked to that of every
other citizen.' 0 '
Reducing white flight will not only make effective school integration
possible, '02 it also will help desegregate inner city areas. Metropolitan school
districts will provide one less reason for whites to leave the city and one
less obstacle to whites settling in the city.
In addition, metropolitan districts will eliminate the inequities in school
financing." 3 A single tax base for the entire school district will exist.' 4 No
longer will wealthy sections of an urban area easily raise large sums of money
while poorer areas struggle to raise less. Metropolitan districts will insure
that the same amount is spent on the education of all students in an urban
area, rich and poor, white and black.' In fact, there is a widespread belief
among educators that metropolitan districts would be more economically
feasible.'0 6 Large, single districts would be better equipped to provide ser-
99. Lawrence, Segregation Misunderstood: The Milliken Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F.L.
Rev. 15, 15 (1977) (given the increasingly segregated urban/suburban demography metropolitan
desegregation is the last hope for an effective remedy) [hereinafter cited as Lawrence].
100. Foster, Milliken v. Bradley: Implications for Desegregation Centers and Metropolitan
Desegregation, in MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY: IMPLICATIONS FOR METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION, CON-
FERENCE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIvnL RIGHTS 127, 135-36 (1974) (report prepared
by F. Routh, E. Waldo, & C. Hurley) [hereinafter cited as Foster]. See also Antibusing Debate,
supra note 89, at 170 (discussion of existing social science research highlighting the "white-
flight" phenomena).
101. Wright, supra note 13, at 225.
102. Some might argue that white flight would continue, albeit in a different form. White
parents would simply send their children to private or parochial schools and thereby frustrate
effective desegregation. There is, however, no evidence that this shift to private or parochial
schools would be so significant as to limit desegregation. Sedler, supra note 17, at 539 n.12.
In fact, the experience of cities which have attempted metropolitan desegregation is that such
white flight to private and parochial schools is minimal and short-lived. For example, in Charlotte,
North Carolina; Tampa, Florida; and Nashville, Tennessee, all cities where metropolitan desegrega-
tion occurred, whites eventually returned to the public schools. STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 57.
103. Sedler, supra note 17, at 554 (metropolitan desegregation would necessarily result in
a sharing of educational resources by wealthy suburban districts). See Foster, supra note 100,
at 135-36 (metropolitan desegregation would improve the delivery of services in schools and
would reduce the inequalities of educational conditions); Harrison, supra note 45, at 19-23
(expand financial resource base through consolidation of existing school districts).
104. Silard, School Finance Equalization: The Beat Goes On, 2 J. L. & EDUC. 470, 471 (1973).
105. Sedler, supra note 17, at 554; Foster, supra note 100, at 135-36.
106. STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 61-62.
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vices for the handicapped and gifted, counseling programs, sophisticated
educational tools, and improved teacher training."07
Metropolitan school districts are not merely a theoretical ideal. Although
metropolitan school districts exist in very few major cities, where such systems
have been implemented they have substantially reduced segregation and have
equalized educational resources."' For example, a metropolitan district created
in Indianapolis, Indiana, decreased black inner city enrollment from forty
to fifteen percent.' 09 When rich and poor are part of the same school system,
the rich will adequately support the system financially, thus, insuring suffi-
cient resources for poor students as well.''"
In sum, only metropolitan school districts can end the injustices of
segregated, unequal schools. Nothing short of breaking down the barriers
between city and suburban schools can eliminate the dual system of education.
Possible Objections to the Creation of Metropolitan School Districts
Metropolitan school districts are politically, economically, and
administratively feasible.'" To support this conclusion it is necessary to ex-
amine the potential objections to metropolitan districts.
Opponents of metropolitan districts might initially argue that such an ap-
proach is undesirable because it would increase the busing of students." 2
At the very least, more busing would make metropolitan districts politically
undesirable since few politicans would support a proposal that would increase
busing. However, whites and blacks live in sufficient proximity in urban areas
so as to make extensive busing unnecessary in metropolitan districts." 3 As
University of Chicago Professor Gary Orfield recognizes:
107. Id.
108. See STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 55; Hain, Techniques of Governmental Regulation
to Achieve School Desegregation, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 79 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hain];
Taylor, Metropolitan-Wide Desegregation, 11 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 45, 47-48 (1973).
109. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 76 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975); Manley, Litigation and Metropolitan Integration, 10 URn. LAW.
73, 95-102 (1978).
110. This is the core of the concept of the unitary system: if rich whites have their education
provided by the same system as poor blacks, the whites in providing for themselves will, at
the same time, be providing for minorities. HARRISON, supra note 45, at 185 n.3. One author
noted that:
Social Security and Medicare ... both are popular because of their unitary nature,
offering a single system of assistance from which virtually everyone benefits. Since
blacks and whites, rich and poor, receive benefits under the auspices of the same
program, the interests of all Americans are inextricably linked. No one wishes to
impede the program's operation because to do so would threaten his self-interest.
One stands to gain by expanding the program, to lose by its contraction.
Book Review, supra note 91, at 648.
111. TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, REPORT OF THE SELECT Comm=TTEE ON EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 114-15 (1972).
112. Hain, supra note 108, at 808.
113. MUST WE Bus?, supra note 15, at 148-49 (reorganization of existing busing systems
to effectuate desegregation could result in both decreased travel time and decreased expenditure).
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A metropolitan plan often requires little more busing than one confined
to the city. One reason this is so is that operation of separate city and
suburban systems often prevents easy desegregation of adjacent schools
of different racial composition that happen to be on opposite sides of
the city-suburban boundary line.'"
In contrast to the general view, busing school children under a metropolitan
desegregation program is not extensive compared with busing for intradistrict
desegregation.' In fact, there is strong evidence that metropolitan districts
often would reduce the amount of busing necessary to achieve
desegregation.'' 6 Currently, there are so few whites in inner cities that
extensive busing is necessary to integrate schools. By contrast, the large
number of students in metropolitan districts would make it possible to achieve
desegregation with less busing. Suburban schools are often close enough to
city boundaries to permit integregation with a minimum of travel time. ' 7
For example, in Charlotte, North Carolina, a metropolitan desegregation plan
reduced the average bus ride from one hour to thirty-five minutes." 8 Similar-
ly, in Detroit, a proposed metropolitan plan estimated a maximum travel
time of forty minutes, compared with previous trips of up to an hour and
a half. ' 9 In short, metropolitan plans make it possible to achieve greater
desegregation with the same, if not less transportation.'2
This is not to say that metropolitan districts can effectively desegregate
schools without any busing. Rather, the point is that busing need be no
greater than what already occurs in intradistrict plans, and that, generally,
it even can be less. Furthermore, metropolitan plans can design busing pro-
grams to insure that no trips are unreasonably long in light of the age of
the students and the distance to be travelled.' 2 '
A second possible objection to metropolitan school districts is that a loss
114. Id.
115. STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 42.
116. Id. at 52. Generally, busing for desegregation does not substantially add to the travel
time needed to get to and from school. In a study of eleven cities that used busing for desegrega-
tion, the average trip increased by more than fifteen minutes in only two cities; in six cities
the time for travel remained the same. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON Civtn. RIGHTS, YOUR CHILD
AND BUSING 21-22 (1972).
117. STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 53-54.
118. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971).
119. See Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 925-28 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Hain, The Law
of Desegregation, 18 MICH. SCHOOL BD. J. 22, 31 (1971).
120. Foster, supra note 100, at 135-36. While most students in both cities and suburbs can
be part of desegregated schools with metropolitan districts, it is true that there may be some
students for whom integration is not possible. However, these students will also benefit from
metropolitan districts because they will be assured educational expenditures equal to that of
all students in the district.
121. In Swann, the Supreme Court said that busing plans should be reasonable so as to
prevent trips where "the time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of
the children or significantly impinge on the educational process." 402 U.S. 1, at 30-31. The
same criteria of reasonability should be followed in designing busing plans for metropolitan
school districts.
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of local control over educational decision-making would result.' 22 Opponents
might argue that separate school districts permit maximum local involve-
ment in administering the schools. However, decentralized decision-making
within metropolitan districts, would prevent loss of local control.13 As the
United States Commission on Civil Rights report notes: "[diecentralization
of decision-making in reorganized districts can avert a loss of local control
or parental influence and, indeed, may even furnish parents with far more
participation."' 24 Metropolitan districts are designed to centralize the assign-
ment of pupils and the raising of revenue; virtually everything else can be
handled by community subdistricts.' 2 5 In New York City, for example, com-
munity subdistricts have authority to hire and fire faculty, allocate the budget,
and make curriculum decisions.'26 As such, "[a] metropolitan system can
result in a centralized-decentralized form of governance with the best of both
worlds-central efficiency of operation and a considerable amount of decen-
tralized control." 27
Metropolitan districts will mean that some children might not attend
neighborhood schools; nevertheless, this should not prevent parental involve-
ment or local control. Control by a community of parents is possible as
long as their children attend the same school, whether or not they all live
in the school's immediate neighborhood.' 25 Parents' councils can be formed
for each subdistrict, permitting substantial community involvement in the
schools' operations.'29
Concerns about local control should be placed in perspective. Although
local control is laudable, it is not more important than eliminating the dual
system of education. In fact, the current educational structure hardly offers
inner city parents a realistic prospect for local control. A "system in which
for some citizens even high taxes produced low educational expenditures could
hardly be justified as offering scope for local choice and 'participation in
the decision-making process.' '"30 While some black educators favor con-
centrating reforms on improving inner city schools through community
control,' 3 ' such actions cannot succeed without more revenues for educa-
122. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-44 (1974); PolrrIcAL LIMITS, supra note 18, at
121-23 (1973); Interdistrict Remedies, supra note 2, at 1188-89.
123. STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 41-42.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 49-50.
126. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590 (McKinney 1968). Although there is no metropolitan district
in New York City, given its size, its use of community subdistricts is a precedent for gover-
nance of even very large metropolitan districts.
127. Foster, supra note 100, at 135-36.
128. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 778-79 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
129. Interdistrict Remedies, supra note 2, at 1189.
130. Taylor, Avoiding the "Thicket," 2 J. L. & EDUC. 482, 483 (1973).
131. See, e.g., Bell, School Litigation Strategies for the 1970's: New Phases in the Continu-
ing Quest for Quality Schools, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 257, 290-92; Serving Two Masters, supra
note 5, at 482, 488-93.
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tion; resources that only will be available with metropolitan districts.'
A third possible objection to metropolitan districts is that their size would
render them administratively unfeasible. However, the experience in many
areas, especially the South and the West, where large county-wide districts
exist, demonstrates that metropolitan districts are practical.' The average
school district in Florida or Louisiana is ten times the geographical size of
the average district in Illinois, New York, or New Jersey.' 34 Moreover, if
subdistricts are created to provide local control, metropolitan districts should
present no administrative obstacles. A central school board can be selected
representing all parts of the metropolitan area,' with community boards
existing to make local decisions.
Finally, some might object to metropolitan districts on the ground that
they will harm the education of white students. The evidence is overwhelm-
ing, however, that desegregation does not decrease the educational achieve-
ment of whites.' 36 Nor would spending for the education of the wealthy
necessarily be reduced. Experience demonstrates that expenditures in poorer
districts will be raised without a decrease in spending in the richer areas. " '
There is absolutely no reason to believe that whites would be harmed by
metropolitan school districts. Metropolitan districts are a practical, effective
way to provide equal educational opportunity. In fact, they are the only way.
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO CREATE
METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS
The Futility of Litigation
From the beginning of the movement to desegregate schools, reformers
turned to the federal courts for relief. Long before the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,'38 there was extensive litigation
in federal courts aimed at ending the inequities in public education.' The
132. Poussaint & Lewis, School Desegregation: A Synonym for Racial Equality, in SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION: SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE 27-28 (F. Levinsohn & B. Wright eds. 1976).
133. STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 43.
134. Hain, supra note 108, at 809-10 n.125.
135. Id.
136. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CrvIL RIGHTS, TwENTY-FrvE YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUALI-
TY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 73 (1975); JENCKS, supra note 7, at 104-06; Weinberg, The
Relationship Between School Desegregation and Academic Achievement: A Review of Research,
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 268-69 (1975).
137. Professor Harrison recognized that:
In our research we have documented that public school finance reform consistently
results in relatively greater expenditures by poor school systems. However, we have
never found that any specific public school finance reform strongly reduces ab-
solute expenditures by the rich. Thus the reason that public school finance reform
results in both greater expenditures, and more equal expenditures, is because it helps
poor school systems more than the rich, not because it hurts rich school systems
more than the poor.
HARRISON, supra note 45, at 185.
138. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
139. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (because of gross disparity between
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landmark decision in Brown produced a tremendous increase in cases as plain-
tiffs filed suits challenging segregated school systems existing throughout the
country.""4 Massive resistance by state and local officials" meant that the
only hope for effective desegregation was through judicial action.' 2 Although
progress towards desegregation was slow, as whites opposing integration tried
every imaginable ground for delay,' 3 the judiciary remained aggressive in
attempting to carry out Brown's mandate."'
state supported University of Texas Law School and newly established black law school, legal
education offered black petitioner is not substantially equal and the equal protection clause
requires that he be admitted to the University of Texas Law School); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (because appellant black student was entitled to receive
same treatment as any other properly admitted student in state supported university, segregated
library, dining room and classroom facilities constituted a violation of equal protection); Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (Missouri's plan to prevent black applicant's
enrollment in only state law school violative of equal protection despite fact that state was
prepared to pay tuition at out-of-state school); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908)
(state statute which permits education of both whites and blacks by the same corporation in
separate localities does not defeat the object of a grant to maintain a college for all persons);
Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (state court's refusal of
injunction to prevent unequal school board distribution of funds not state action within mean-
ing of fourteenth amendment). There also were repeated efforts to secure relief from state
courts. See, e.g., Williams v. Board of Educ., 79 Kan. 202, 99 P. 216 (1908) (black, pre-high
school students cannot be compelled to attend a separate school when such attendance involves
unavoidable hazard of travel through dangerous industrial area); State ex rel. Clark v. Maryland
Inst. for Promotion of Mechanical Arts, 87 Md. 643, 41 A. 126 (1898) (refusal of private
school to admit black students not violative of fourteenth amendment). See also Larson, The
New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 470, 482-83 (citing over 60 law suits challenging
inadequate physical facilities, teacher qualifications, and curriculum of all black schools).
140. For a discussion of this litigation, see J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); GRAGLIA, supra
note 12; WILKINSON, supra note 12.
141. FOr a description of this resistance, see R. GATES, THE MAKING OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE:
VIRGINIA POLITICS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1962); B. MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE
1-209 (1964); Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, in THE WAROEN COURT: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 46 (R. Sayler, B. Boyer & R. Gooding eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Carter]; Bickel,
The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUMV[. L. REV. 193 (1964);
McKay, With All Deliberate Speed: Legislative Reactions and Judicial Development 1956-57,
43 VA. L. REV. 1205 (1957).
142. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). The Supreme Court, in an unprecedented
opinion signed by all nine justices, affirmed its holding in Brown and ordered desegregation
of the Little Rock, Arkansas schools after the Governor of Arkansas had dispatched troops
to prevent black students from entering the white high school. The Supreme Court declared:
"[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution .... No
state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating
his undertaking to support it." Id. at 18. See also Bush v. New Orleans Parish School Bd.,
188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960) (refusing to give effect to "interposition acts" passed by
southern legislatures to prevent desegregation), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
143. Opposition to desegregation in the South was illustrated by the fact that ten years after
Brown, "eleven states of the old Confederacy had a mere 1.17 percent of their black students
attending schools with white students." Carter, supra note 141, at 55-56. For a description
of the various techniques used by Southern states to avoid the mandate of Brown, see supra
note 141.
144. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965) (per curiam)
(lower court's approval of proposed school desegregation plan improper without full hearing
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Unfortunately, this aggressive posture did not extend to the judicial crea-
tion of metropolitan school districts. In Milliken v. Bradley,' 5 the Supreme
Court sharply limited the authority of federal courts to create interdistrict
remedies. Milliken was the Supreme Court's first reversal of an affirmative
desegregation order since Brown.'" In Milliken, the federal district court
ordered fifty-three suburban school districts to participate in the desegrega-
tion of the Detroit schools.' 7 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit recognized that
"any less comprehensive a solution than a metropolitan plan would result
in an all-black system immediately surrounded by practically all-white subur-
ban school systems." 8 The court held that since "school district lines are
simply matters of political convenience . . . they may not be used to deny
constitutional rights."' 9
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the lower court's imposi-
tion of a metropolitan-wide remedy. The Court reasoned that suburban districts
could not be included in the desegregation plan absent proof that they com-
mitted a constitutional violation.' 0 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, held that the metropolitan-wide remedy violated the equitable
principle that "the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and
extent of the constitutional violation.' 5 ' Thus, the Court declared that "[t]o
approve the remedy ordered would . . . impose on the outlying districts,
not shown to have committed any constitutional violation, a wholly imper-
missible remedy.""2'
Although the Court did not rule out the possibility of judicially created
metropolitan relief in all cases,' 3 the Court made it clear that such relief
was to be viewed as an extraordinary remedy. The Court emphasized the
importance of local control over schools, something that the Court believed
was unjustifiably sacrificed by the lower court's order in Milliken. 54
Moreover, the Court implied that it regarded creation of metropolitan districts
to be a political decision and not one to be implemented judicially.'55
The ultimate effect of the Milliken decision is to prevent judicial creation
on adversaries' claims of racial bias in faculty allocation); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377
U.S. 218, 229 (1964) (county board's failure to fund public schools, while not at the same
time providing grants to white students to attend private schools, violative of equal protection).
145. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
146. Lawrence, supra note 99, at 15.
147. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
148. Milliken v. Bradley, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
149. Id. at 244.
150. 418 U.S. at 745.
151. Id. at 744 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
152. Id. at 745.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 741-44. But see id. at 778-79 (White, J., dissenting) (political subdivisions of
states have never been considered sovereign governmental entities but rather as subordinate
functional bodies).
155. Id. at 743-44.
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of metropolitan school districts except in the most unusual cases.' 56 As one
commentator noted:
By fixing limits to the remedial powers available to the federal courts in
desegregation cases, the Supreme Court, has, however, thwarted this evolu-
tion in its earliest stages, and effectively removed from the realm of possibilities
any constitutional attack on inter-district school segregation arising from
residential patterns.'
Milliken only permits interdistrict remedies if there is proof that the subur-
ban districts committed a constitutional violation. Occasionally, this can be
demonstrated.' For example, a metropolitan remedy was imposed for Wilm-
ington, Delaware, because of the state's involvement in creating segregated
schools.' 59 Unlike Michigan in the Milliken case, Delaware once required segrega-
tion of all schools within the state. At one point, Delaware even subsidized in-
terdistrict transport to private schools for white students to deter them from
attending Wilmington schools. 6 ' Furthermore, Delaware had enacted a law con-
156. See Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The Case
for Land Use Strategies, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 187, 188 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term,
88 HARV. L. REV. 61, 69-71 (1974).
157. Historical Perspective, supra note 16, at 801.
158. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 738-48. See also Kanner, Interdistrict Remedies for School
Segregation after Milliken v. Bradley and Hills v. Gautreaux, 48 Miss. L.J. 33 (1977) (inter-
district relief appropriate where boundary lines have been manipulated to maintain segregation,
where more than one district has committed violations, or where a violation in one district
has a significant segregative effect in other districts); Manley, School Desegregation in the North:
A Post-Milliken Strategy for Obtaining Metropolitan Relief, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 585, 600 (1976)
(discussing evidence presented in United States v. Missouri, 63 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Mo. 1973),
388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.
1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975)).
159. Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976) (metropolitan plan implementa-
tion ordered). The intradistrict remedy imposed in Evans was the culmination of a series of
lawsuits. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware originally determined
that a dual school system existed in Wilmington. It ordered the Wilmington School District
to submit to the court a desegregation plan. Evans v. Buchanan, 379 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Del.
1974). At a subsequent hearing, the court permitted plaintiffs to introduce evidence concerning
interdistrict constitutional violations. The court determined that an historic arrangement for
interdistrict segregation existed within New Castle County. In addition, the court concluded
that state housing policy contributed to the racial isolation of the city from the suburbs, resulting in
racially segregated schools. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd, 423
U.S. 963 (1976). Because of this significant governmental involvement in interdistrict segrega-
tion, an interdistrict remedy was appropriate. Accordingly, the court ordered the parties to
submit a desegregation plan incorporating the areas surrounding Wilmington. Id. at 447. The
court eventually approved a plan requiring the exchange of some 2000 black students from
the Wilmington School District with an equal number of white students from suburban school
districts. Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976).
160. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 436 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1976).
In 1968, the Delaware General Assembly authorized a subsidy for transportation of pupils enrolled
in non-public, non-profit elementary and secondary schools. Although the statutes provided
only for intradistrict transportation, the Board of Education adopted policies providing for
subsidy of interdistrict transportation. In 1973, the General Assembly passed legislation ex-
pressly authorizing a subsidy for interdistrict transportation of private and parochial students. Id.
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solidating school districts in the Wilmington area, but excluded the predom-
inantly black schools of Wilmington.' 6 ' These state actions were deemed to
be sufficient to justify the creation of a metropolitan-wide remedy. Similarly,
metropolitan relief was permitted for Louisville, Kentucky because the state
and the school districts in the area participated in creating segregated schools. '62
Nonetheless, these instances in which metropolitan relief was permitted,
are clearly the exception. In case after case, the federal courts, following
the dictates of Milliken, have refused to order metropolitan-wide
desegregation.' 63 It is usually impossible to prove that the suburbs or state
governments are directly responsible for the existence of segregated schools
in the cities."6 Generally, segregated inner city schools are a product of the
many factors that have lead to the racial separation of blacks and whites,
most of which are entirely unrelated to school policy.'6" As a result, after
Milliken it is futile to hope for judicial action creating metropolitan school
districts to eliminate the dual system of urban public education.' 6
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the federal courts
will not act to equalize educational expenditures. In San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez,'67 the Supreme Court refused to find that
financing schools through local property taxes violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs challenged
Texas' system of financing public schools largely through the property tax,
161. 393 F. Supp. at 438-39. The Educational Advancement Act of 1968, 14 Del. C. §§
1001-05 (1968), provided for the reorganization of all school districts in the state of Delaware.
The key reorganization provision of the Act provided an exemption of approximately one year
from the long standing requirement in Delaware law that consolidation of contiguous school
districts must be approved by a referendum in each of the districts affected. The State Board
of Education was authorized to consolidate school districts according to the dictates of sound
educational administration. The Wilmington School District, however, was specifically excluded
from the Board's reorganization powers. Wilmington was also implicitly excluded from any
consolidation plan by section 1004(c) (2), which limited the size of the district to 12,000 students.
393 F. Supp. at 438-39.
162. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975). The court pointed to a number of factors justifying a metropolitan
remedy in Louisville: all districts had operated segregated districts; Kentucky law made the
county, and not the school district, the basic educational unit; all of the school districts had
ignored school district lines in maintaining segregated schools. Id. at 1359-61.
163. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1981) (no evidence
that interdistrict program had significant interdistrict segregative effect); Tasby v. Estes, 572
F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978) (exclusion of suburban school districts from metropolitan segregation
plan affirmed); Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1974) (district court judge
has equitable power to reject proposed desegregation plans, including interdistrict remedy, ab-
sent showing of prior de jure segregation); Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir.
1974) (district court did not err in determining that segregation was consequence of housing
patterns and not purposeful acts by the school board).
164. STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 98. See Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board.-
Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976).
165. See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
166. Sedler, supra note 17, at 538-43; Historical Perspective, supra note 16, at 801.
167. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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which enabled wealthy school districts to tax at a low rate and spend a great
deal on education, whereas poor districts taxing at high rates still had little
revenue for schools.' 68 The Court held that strict scrutiny of the Texas system
was inappropriate because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classifica-
tion was involved; the majority concluded that education is not a fundamental
right and that poverty is not a suspect classification.' 69 As such, the Court
said that Texas' system needed only to meet a rational basis test, a test the
Court found to be easily satisfied. 7 ' The effect of Rodriguez "was to
foreclose a federal attack on inequitable school financing programs."' 7 ' State
courts have proven equally unwilling to remedy disparate educational
financing. I7"
The combined effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in Milliken and
Rodriguez is to preclude effective judicial solutions to the problems of
separate, unequal education. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Milliken, recog-
nized that "[tioday's decision given Rodriguez means that there is no viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause though the schools are segregated by
race and though the black schools are not only 'separate' but inferior. '
Only metropolitan-wide solutions can end the dual system of education.
Because the Supreme Court has prevented the judiciary from creating such
remedies, litigation will never succeed in providing equal educational
opportunity.
Legislative Creation of Metropolitan School Districts
Despite the restrictive decisions in Milliken and Rodriguez, attention has
remained focused on obtaining judicial solutions to the problems of urban
schools.' 74 Courts, however, are unable to create the needed metropolitan
school districts; therefore, efforts should turn to enacting legislation im-
168. Id. at 12-13.
169. Id. at 28, 33-37.
170. Id. at 25, 36-39 (considerations such as local control over education and the need to
defer to the political process were deemed to be sufficient to meet the rational basis test).
171. Roos, The Potential Impact of Rodriquez on Other School Reform Litigation, 38 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRORS. 566, 566 (1974).
172. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, UPDATE ON STATE-WIDE SCHOOL
FINANCE CASES (1980) (describing litigation in 30 states). A recent article recognized that "[t]he
hope that state litigation would constitutionalize educational entitlements unavailable at the
federal level has proved illusory." Comment, Developments in the Law: The Interpretation
of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1447 (1982). See, e.g., Shofstall v.
Hollings, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973) (state court refusal to equalize funding of educa-
tion); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975) (disparate tax base resulting
in unequal school funding not violative of state constitutional requirement of uniform system
of public schools); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976) (financing system not in-
validated by existence of equitable alternatives). But see, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. I v.
State, 90 Wash 2d. 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (state constitutional mandate imposes a duty on
the state to provide fully sufficient funds for general and uniform system of public schools).
173. 418 U.S. at 761 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
174. MUST WE Bus?, supra note 15, at 441-42, 454-55.
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plementing metropolitan educational plans. Laws should be enacted, at either
the federal or state level, requiring that education in urban areas be pro-
vided in school districts encompassing both the central city and the suburbs.
Legislative action should not be perceived as an unfortunate alternative
to judicial solutions. To the contrary, the legislature should be regarded as
the preferred forum for ending the dual system of education.'75 The legislature
is most able to provide the administrative structure needed to make
metropolitan districts an effective reality.' 6 Additionally, action by popularly
elected legislatures will have the greatest legitimacy and the best chance for
success. '"
Either Congress or state legislatures can enact laws requiring creation of
metropolitan school districts. Although education traditionally has been con-
trolled by state and local governments, Congress has authority to require
metropolitan districts pursuant to its powers under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Section five of the fourteenth amendment provides that "Congress
shall have the power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.""'7 Historically, congressional authority under section five
of the fourteenth amendment was limited to enacting legislation invalidating
state laws deemed to violate section one of the fourteenth amendment or
providing remedies for state infringements of section one.' 7 9 In Katzenbach
v. Morgan,'85 however, the Supreme Court upheld broad congressional
authority to expand the protections of the post-Civil War Amendments.
Katzenbach involved a challenge to a federal statute which effectively over-
turned a Supreme Court decision. Previously, in Lassister v. Northampton
County Board of Elections,'' the Court ruled that literacy tests as a voting
qualification did not violate the fourteenth amendment. A few years after
the Lassister decision, Congress, in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, '82 pro-
175. Professor Finger recognized that:
The courts may not be the most effective agency for carrying out such broad social
remedies as desegregation .... Characteristics of cities are so different that a judge
providing remedial procedures consistent with what has been approved by higher
courts may have difficulty selecting procedures that are both appropriate and
equitable.
Finger, supra note 6, at 65.
176. Wright, supra note 13, at 224 ("[Elffective solutions to most urban problems are best
initiated through the legislatures, both state and federal, and best implemented by agencies
of the executive branches with the expertise necessary to supervise and enforce compliance.").
177. MUST WE Bus?, supra note 15, at 454-55.
178. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
179. Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 656 (1977).
See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
180. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
181. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
182. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 placed stringent restriction on the use of literacy tests
as a determinant of voter qualification. The Act, in relevant part, provided:
(2) No person acting under color of law shall-
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vided that no person who has successfully completed the sixth grade in an
accredited Spanish-language Puerto Rican school may be denied the right
to vote because of an inability to read or write English. A group of New
York voters brought suit to challenge the congressional invalidation of that
state's literacy test. The plaintiffs contended that Congress had no authority
to act under the fourteenth amendment because the Court already had decided
that no constitutional violation existed.
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim and sustained the federal
statute. The Court held that Congress could justify striking down the literacy
requirement in order to aid the Puerto Rican community in gaining suffi-
cient political power to obtain non-discriminatory treatment in the provision
of public services. '83 Additionally, the Court concluded that Congress, on
its own, could find that literacy tests violated the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments and ban such tests under the grants of legislative authority con-
c) employ any literacy test as a qualification for voting in any election unless (i)
such test is administered to each individual and is conducted wholly in writing,
and (ii) a certified copy of 4ie test and of the answers given by the individual
is furnished to him within twenty-five days ...
42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(c) (1965) (amended 1970).
In addition the Act automatically suspended, for a five year period, the use of literacy tests
in all states or subdivisions where a literacy test or other similar device was in effect on November
1, 1964 and where less than 50% of voting age persons were registered for or voted in the
presidential election of November 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1965) (amended 1970).
In the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Congress extended the suspension for an
additional five year period. In addition, the scope of the suspension was expanded to include
all state and national elections. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1970) (amended 1976).
Originally the nationwide suspension was to expire in August of 1975. Congress, however,
subsequently reconsidered the issue of literacy requirements and permanently prohibited the
use of literacy tests as a means of determining voter eligibility. The current version of the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, in relevant part, provides:
(a) No citizen shall be denied, because of his failure to comply with any test or
device, the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election conducted in any
State or political subdivision of a State.
(b) As used in this Section, the term "test or device" means any requirement that
a person as a prerequisite for voting or-registration for voting (1) demonstrate the
ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educa-
tional achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good
moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters
or members of any other class.
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1976).
According to legislative history, literacy tests have notoriously been used to deny minorities
the franchise. Congress deemed it patently unfair for the states to require citizens to achieve
a certain level of education prior to voting when the state educational systems often denied
minority citizens an opportunity to achieve this level of education. In addition, Congress con-
sidered literacy tests to be invalid under the fourteenth amendment because they were not justified
by a compelling state interest. S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 774, 789-90.
183. 384 U.S. at 652-53. See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (Supreme
Court denied request for injunction against enforcement of Voting Rights Act of 1965).
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tained in those amendments.' 84 This latter holding gives Congress broad
authority to interpret the fourteenth amendment and to implement that in-
terpretation via legislation.' 85
Katzenbach provides clear authority for Congress to enact legislation re-
quiring education to be provided in metropolitan school systems. Congress
can find that the segregation of blacks in inferior schools is a violation of
the fourteenth amendment. Furthermore, Congress can provide the remedy
for this constitutional violation: metropolitan school districts. Congress is
not bound by the Supreme Court's refusal to find constitutional violations
in Milliken and Rodriguez. In Katzenbach, the Supreme Court allowed Con-
gress to find and remedy a constitutional violation where the Court previously,
in Lassister, had refused to find one.' 6 Accordingly, Congress will be able
to determine that separate, unequal schools are impermissible and provide
a statutory solution in the form of metropolitan districts.
Congress need not involve itself in the actual operation of urban schools.
Rather, Congress could simply enact a statute requiring all states with urban
areas of greater than a specified size to eliminate the boundaries separating
city from suburban school districts. The states would be directed to create
districts which include all residents of the urban area. In this way, Congress
would leave education to state and local goveinments. Congressional action
would be limited to requiring the creation of metropolitan districts. Although
Congress would be compelling the states to act, there would be no basis
for an objection based on federalism concerns.' 87 The Supreme Court has
184. 384 U.S. at 653-56. The Katzenbach Court considered the constitutionality of § 4(e)
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which provides:
(1) Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment of persons educated in American flag schools in which the predominant
classroom language was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the State
from conditioning the right to vote of such persons on ability to read, write, under-
stand, or interpret any matter in the English language.
(2) No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth primary
grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or ter-
ritory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which
the predominant classroom language was other than English, shall be denied the
right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his inability to
read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language, except
that in States in which State law provides that a different level of education is
presumptive of literacy, he shall demonstrate that he has successfully completed
an equivalent level of education in a public school, or a private school accredited
by any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puer-
to Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than English.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976).
See also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (1965 Voting Rights Act did
not exceed congressional power to enforce the fifteenth amendment); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970) (fifteenth amendment grants to Congress the authority to permit 18-year-old
to vote in national elections).
185. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 691-92 (1978).
186. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
187. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The National League
of Cities Court held unconstitutional a federal statute requiring states to pay their employees
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held that federalism is not a barrier to congressional action pursuant to sec-
tion five of the fourteenth amendment.'88
Alternatively, Congress could use its spending powers to encourage the
creation of metropolitan districts. Congress could provide grants to school
districts which form. metropolitan-wide school systems and deny federal money
to states which permit separate school systems for city and suburban areas.' 89
Those who object to Congress compelling the states to create metropolitan
districts might prefer this latter, "carrot and stick" approach, which osten-
sibly allows state and local governments a choice.
There is no reason why the legislation must be federal; state governments
could enact laws consolidating city and suburban school districts. The federal
government does have the advantage of being able to provide interdistrict
remedies in the few places where metropolitan areas cross state lines. For
example, a metropolitan district might include Washington, D.C. and its
Maryland and Virginia suburbs. Only Congress could create a single school
district for this entire region. Similarly, a district including New York and
New Jersey would require some form of federal legislative action. 9 ' Also,
because segregated, unequal schools are common in urban areas throughout
the country, a federal remedy, national in scope, seems appropriate.
Nonetheless, state legislatures need not wait for congressional action. School
districts, like all local governments, are creatures of the state. As such, states
may enact laws requiring consolidation of districts and specify all of the
procedures for their operation.
a minimum wage. The Court emphasized that Congress had plenary authority to regulate private
commercial activity. The Court determined, however, that Congress' ability to regulate the conduct
of state governments was limited by priciples of state sovereignty. Congress may not exercise
its power to regulate commerce so as to usurp a state's decision making power regarding essen-
tial governmental functions. Id. at 842-45. According to the Court, the minimum wage require-
ment displaced the state's ability to structure employer-employee relationships. This displace-
ment denied the state discretion regarding the method of providing traditional services such
as police and fire protection. Id. at 845-48.
188. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The Fitzpatrick Court held that state
sovereignty did not bar state employees from filing civil rights actions against the state to challenge
the denial of retirement benefits. According to the Court, the prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment were directed toward the states, and were restrictions of state power. Id. at 454.
Accordingly, the principle of state sovereignty is limited by § 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
which grants Congress the authority to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the amendment's
substantive provisions. Id. at 452-56. In other words, the principle of National League of Cities
does not limit Congress when it is acting, as is proposed in this Article, pursuant to section
five of the fourteenth amendment.
189. See Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (upholding congressional
authority to place strings on federal grants to states and localities). Cf. Penhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (conditions on grants to states and localities
must be clear and explicit).
190. Interstate compacts to create metropolitan districts crossing state lines would require
congressional approval. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. See Engdahl, Characterization of
Interstate Arrangements: When Is a Compact Not a Compact?, 64 Micot. L. REV. 63 (1965);
Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study In Interstate Ad-
justments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Ultimately, of course, it is of secondary concern whether the legislation
is enacted at the federal or state level. What is crucial is that efforts to
enact legislation creating metropolitan school districts begin. No other solu-
tion can succeed in eliminating the dual system of American public educa-
tion. There is, today, no other way to establish metropolitan districts except
through legislative action.
CONCLUSION
In September, 1982, United States Secretary of Education, T. H. Bell,
suggested that state legislatures consider reorganizing school districts to
desegregate schools.' 9 ' Secretary Bell recognized that without metropolitan
districts it will be impossible to ever achieve equal educational opportunity.
That a cabinet secretary in the conservative Reagan administration would
offer such a suggestion, is an indication that legislation for metropolitan
districts should not be dismissed as an impossibility. It is the responsibility
of civil rights groups, educators, and all who care about urban America,
to begin lobbying for such legislation. As Brown approaches its thirtieth
birthday, is it not finally time that equal educational opportunity be pro-
vided with all deliberate speed?
191. Bell Proposes School Remap for Integration, Chicago Sun Times, Sept. 13, 1982, at
7, col. I.
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